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1. INTRODUCTION 
Expert advice is crucial to the discipline of efficient markets. Both individual and institutional 
investors benefit from expert advice in several forms among the most important of which are equity 
analysts’ stock recommendations (hereafter, stock recommendations) and debt analysts’ credit ratings 
(hereafter, credit ratings). Previous research has documented the incremental informational contents 
of stock recommendations (Baik & Park, 2003; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, & Trueman, 2001; 
Jegadeesh & Kim, 2006; Jiang & Kim, 2016; Liu, Smith, & Syed, 1990; Menéndez-Requejo, 2005; 
Wormac, 1996) and credit ratings (Blanco, Brennan, & Marsh, 2005; Boot, Milbourn, & Schmeits, 
2006; Chung, Ann Frost, & Kim, 2012; Creighton, Gower, & Richards, 2007; Goh & Ederington, 
1993; Hand, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1992; Holthausen & Leftwich, 1986; Hull, Predescu, & White, 
2004; Kliger & Sarig, 2000; Norden & Weber, 2004; J. Wang, Svec, & Peat, 2014). According to 
these previous studies and many others, stock recommendations drive equity markets and credit 
ratings affect both equity and debt markets (i.e. bond and credit default swap “CDS” markets). Hence, 
it can be argued that stock recommendations partially reflect the market risk included in trading a 
certain stock, whereas credit ratings partially reflect the credit risk or default risk included in trading a 
certain bond. 
Although much literature has focused on the informational contents of stock recommendations and 
credit ratings and how their bias could affect the efficiency of equity and debt markets, to the best of 
our knowledge, no previous research has investigated the reputational effects of such expert advice. 
The major reason for such a lack of this type of research is the obvious difficulty of measuring 
reputational risk. Hence, we exploit the unique opportunity of the quantifiable reputational damage 
known to be caused by operational risk announcements in financial institutions
2
 to gauge the 
incremental reputational effects of stock recommendations and credit ratings beyond any firm-level 
factors, event-specific features and announcement-related characteristics. 
Our main argument in this paper is that operational risk announcements constitute an unexpected 
arrival of bad news disclosing the operational loss amount and reflecting the event-causing internal 
control weaknesses (ICWs) and other relevant firm-level deficiencies. Hence, this adverse 
idiosyncratic informational shock hitting the financial markets should cause investors to revise their 
prior beliefs about the expected amounts and probabilities of cash flows (i.e. valuation and 
creditworthiness) of the loss firm, thus imposing a reputational impact beyond the nominal equity-
depleting operational loss amount (Cummins, Lewis, & Wei, 2006; Gillet, Hübner, & Plunus, 2010; 
Plunus, Gillet, & Huebner, 2012). Since a crucial part of these prior investors’ beliefs are inevitably 
formed by expert advice (i.e. stock recommendations and credit ratings), we argue that such a 
                                                          
2 See Section 2.1. for a detailed review of the literature on operational and reputational risks in financial institutions. 
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reputational impact would be partially determined by the loss firm’s stock recommendation 
favorability and credit rating level. 
There are two contradictory theories in the literature that might explain the reputational effects of 
stock recommendations and credit ratings around operational risk announcements. First, the 
“Expectancy Violation Theory” (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006), whereby the unexpected arrival of bad 
news would seriously violate prior optimistic investors’ expectations, hence, accentuating the adverse 
reputational effects in firms with more favorable stock recommendations and higher credit ratings. In 
this case, expert advice would be a reputational burden on the loss firm. Second, the “Institutional 
Legitimacy” theory (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006), whereby expert advice provided by well-established 
institutions (e.g. equity analysts working for brokerage houses and debt analysts in credit rating 
agencies) gains escalating credibility (i.e. legitimacy) and becomes more difficult to be challenged by 
less informed investors. Hence, non-expert equity investors would expect firms with more favorable 
stock recommendations and higher credit ratings to continue to have more robust financial 
performance and less risky business profile in the future, thus making them more resilient to the 
adverse consequences of the announced operational risk events and more able to remedy their 
underlying causes. In this case, expert advice would serve as a reputational asset of the loss firm. 
In this Paper, we have two main objectives. First, given the contradictory theories and mixed 
empirical evidence in the literature about how investors behave around reputation-damaging events, 
we aim to introduce and analyze empirical evidence drawn from the financial industry on whether and 
why stock recommendations and credit ratings could act as a reputational asset or reputational liability 
upon the unexpected arrival of bad news into financial markets. Second, we aim to enhance the 
prediction models of the reputational damage caused by operational risk announcements through 
including expert advice variables (i.e. stock recommendations and credit ratings) that reflect the prior 
beliefs/expectations of more informed investors
3
.  
Our study contributes to the literature on reputational risk and expert advice in several ways. First, 
this is the first paper to empirically examine whether stock recommendations and credit ratings could 
serve as a reputational shield in a business context. Second, we update the literature on the 
determinants of reputational risk by adding a new dimension which is the most recent expert advice. 
Finally, this paper provides evidence based on a post-global financial crisis sample (2010 – 2014) that 
is more recent than any other empirical study on the factors affecting the reputational risk triggered by 
operational risk announcements in the financial industry. 
                                                          
3 It is well-established in the literature that equity and debt analysts get access to much private information through different 
channels among which are their connections with the firm’s management. Hence, it is expected that analyst’s stock 
recommendations and credit ratings would drive the trading behavior of other less informed investors, especially individual 
(household) investors and liquidity traders (See Sections 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. for a more detailed discussion of the relevant 
literature). 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and 
develops our testable hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the research methodology, including sample 
selection, variables tested and empirical models. Section 4 presents and discusses our main empirical 
results. The results of further analysis and robustness checks are presented and discussed in Sections 5 
and 6, respectively. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Review of the Literature on Operational and Reputational Risks 
Financial firms are unavoidably subject to reputational risk
4
 as a result of operational risk event 
announcements
5. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) definition of operational 
risk
6
 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006) and evidence provided by the literature 
(Chernobai, Jorion, & Yu, 2011; Cummins et al., 2006; T. Wang & Hsu, 2013) show that operational 
risk event announcements reveal serious problems in internal control systems, potential fraudulent or 
opportunistic behavior on the part of management and employees, and ultimately weak tone-at-the-top 
corporate governance mechanisms in financial firms. Additionally, previous research found consistent 
evidence of the adverse reputational effects of large operational risk event announcements in the 
financial industry, as reflected by a drop in the market values of loss firms by more than one-to-one 
for internal fraud and non-fraud internally-caused operational losses (Cummins et al., 2006; Fiordelisi, 
Soana, & Schwizer, 2014; Gillet et al., 2010; Perry & Fontnouvelle, 2005; Sturm, 2013b)
7
.   
Plunus, Gillet, & Huebner, 2012 documented an adverse impact of operational risk announcements 
on cumulative abnormal bond returns on both the first press-cutting date and firm recognition date. 
They interpreted their results as “pure” reputational damage since operational risk losses usually do 
not deplete shareholders’ equity and therefore should not be directly relevant to the expected cash 
flows received by creditors. In agreement with Gillet et al.'s, 2010 and disagreement with Sturm's, 
2013b results on stock returns, Plunus et al., 2012 found that debt markets react favorably to 
                                                          
4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009, p.19) defines reputational risk 
as “… the risk arising from negative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors or 
regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or establish new, business relationships and 
continued access to sources of funding (eg through the interbank or securitisation markets). Reputational risk is 
multidimensional and reflects the perception of other market participants. Furthermore, it exists throughout the organisation 
and exposure to reputational risk is essentially a function of the adequacy of the bank’s internal risk management processes, 
as well as the manner and efficiency with which management responds to external influences on bank-related transactions.” 
5 We use the terms “operational risk event announcements” and “Operational risk announcements” to indicate the same thing 
which is the first press-cutting announcement on a certain operational risk event in the public media news. 
6 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p.144) defines operational risk 
as “…the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. 
This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk.” 
7 For example, suppose that the market value of a firm dropped as a result of an announcement of an operational risk event. 
Then, a drop in the market value of three-to-one means that the magnitude of the market value drop is three times the 
magnitude of the operational loss. Hence, only one-to-one drop in the loss firm’s market value is to be considered a 
mechanical market reaction to the operational loss amount disclosed whereas any excess drop in the market value would be 
considered a reputational loss. 
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settlement announcements. Sturm, 2013a inspected the impact of operational risk announcements on 
CDS markets in European banks and found that CDS spreads increase only around settlement 
announcements and when the relative operational loss size is higher. He interpreted these results as 
indicating that some characteristics and timings of operational risk announcements cause an increase 
in the bank’s default risk. We also believe that Sturm's, 2013a results confirm the debt-based “pure” 
reputational damage caused by operational risk announcements previously documented in bond 
markets by Plunus et al., 2012. 
  
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Equity Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
Analysts’ stock recommendations reflect the favorability which highly informed investors and 
experts, that is equity analysts, believe to be involved in trading a particular stock. Stock 
recommendations range in a descending order of favorability from “Strong Buy” to “Buy” to “Hold” 
to “Underperform” to “Sell. Obviously, the more favorable the stock recommendation, the more 
inclined the less informed equity investors and liquidity traders would be to invest in this particular 
stock, thus causing the stock price to appreciate. 
Chang & Chan, 2008 found that the negative reaction of equity markets to downward stock 
recommendations is more than double the positive reaction to upward stock recommendations. 
Menéndez-Requejo, 2005 documented a positive (negative) equity market reaction to “Buy” (“Sell”) 
stock recommendations in a Spanish business context. Several other studies similarly confirmed the 
positive (negative) impact of “Buy” (“Sell”) stock recommendations on stock prices (Beneish, 1991; 
Davies & Canes, 1978; Desai, Liang, & Singh, 2000; Ferreira & Smith, 2003; Liu et al., 1990). 
Wormac, 1996 found strong and persistent equity market reactions to extreme changes in stock 
recommendations (i.e. stocks added to or removed from “Buy” and “Sell” recommendations) over a 
one-to-six-month period following the recommendation changes. Barber & Loeffler, 1993 
documented the positive equity-based informational impact of stock recommendations published in 
the Wall Street Journal’s monthly ‘Dartboard’ column. However, Barber, Lehavy, & Trueman, 1999 
found that equity investors would not incrementally benefit from stock recommendations made by 
top-ranked analysts. In addition, Barber et al., 2001 also found that a stock-recommendation-driven 
investment strategy would not necessarily be profitable, especially after controlling for transaction 
costs. Moreover, Desai & Jain, 1995 found that money managers do not provide informative stock 
recommendations in relation to long-term stock performance. 
These results reported in the stock recommendation literature are obviously mixed and call for 
further research to examine the differential effects of stock recommendations on equity markets under 
various market conditions. In this paper, we choose to investigate the impact of stock 
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recommendations on the subsequent reputational damage to stock prices around operational risk 
announcements. We are interested in finding whether favorable stock recommendations would 
actually mitigate or accentuate the reputational damage which the financial firm could incur around 
operational risk announcements. We find it important to examine this reputational effect of stock 
recommendations from two perspectives. First, from the equity investor’s perspective, our findings 
would guide their investment strategy and let them more accurately predict the equity market over-
reactions or under-reactions associated with specific stock recommendations around operational risk 
announcements. Second, from the loss firm’s perspective, our findings would advise their post-
announcement reputation repair strategy and whether favorable stock recommendations could be 
sufficient as a protection shield against any reputational damage caused by operational risk 
announcements. 
Previous research showed that prior good reputation could serve as either a reputational 
asset/protection or reputational liability/burden around reputation damaging events  (Gatzert, 2015; 
Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). From one side, a good reputation, that is backed up by well-established, 
legitimate and institutionalized expert advice, could make investors more confident in the ability of 
the affected firm to overcome the consequences of the loss event and repair its causes, thus triggering 
less adverse reactions from investors; we call this interpretation the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory 
(Minor & Morgan, 2011; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Schnietz & 
Epstein, 2005). From the other side, a good reputation (i.e. more favorable expert advice) could 
become a liability of the firm because prior optimistic investors’ expectations have not been met, thus 
provoking investors to more aggressively penalize highly reputable firms following reputation 
damaging events; this is called the “Expectancy Violation Theory” (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Wade, 
Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006).  
In the case of operational risk announcements in financial institutions, the “Expectancy Violation 
Theory” interpretation might prevail for two reasons. First, financial institutions are known to have 
high information asymmetry due to complex business models, heavy regulation and supervision 
schemes and severe conflicts of interest among shareholders, managers, creditors and public interests 
(Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016). Such an information opacity would suggest that the financial 
industry is more likely to have the interrelationships of market risk (as partially implied by stock 
recommendations), credit risk (as partially implied by credit ratings) and operational risk (whose data 
is usually confidential and unavailable to the public) mispriced. Hence, operational risk 
announcements are more likely to inject new private information, thus reducing extant information 
asymmetry levels (Barakat, Chernobai, & Wahrenburg, 2014) and correcting previous mispricing in 
the equity and debt markets. Second, the empirical evidence in the reputational risk literature 
documents that larger and more profitable financial firms with higher credit ratings are exposed to a 
more severe reputational damage (Fiordelisi, Soana, & Schwizer, 2013; Sturm, 2013a). 
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Hence, upon the unexpected arrival of news, less informed equity investors and liquidity traders 
(i.e. naïve investors) would be inclined to revise their prior beliefs formed by the most recent stock 
recommendations. If those unexpected pieces of news reveal adverse information about the affected 
firm, as it is the case for operational risk announcements in financial institutions, naïve investors 
could then aggressively correct their prior optimistic beliefs and more heavily sell stocks with ex ante 
favorable stock recommendations. In this sense, the reputational damage caused by operational risk 
announcements could be an ex post correction of equity markets due to a strong revision of ex ante 
investors’ expectations.  
Additionally, since “Buy” stocks represent the most favorable stock recommendation in our 
sample, a big adverse correction of prior optimistic beliefs of equity investors around operational risk 
announcements could be expected for such stocks. Moreover, since “Hold” stocks imply the most 
long-term investment recommendation, this type of stock could be expected to incur the least severe 
equity-based reputational damage around operational risk announcements because the typical 
investor, seeking abnormal long-term returns, would simply continue to hold such stocks. 
Furthermore, less heterogeneity in stock recommendations reflects lower market risk for investors 
and higher cross-sectional stock returns (Baik & Park, 2003; Harrison & Kreps, 1978). Hence, the 
unexpected arrival of bad news in the form of operational risk announcements would constitute a 
bigger surprise for firms with less dispersed stock recommendations, thus likely causing a more 
severe reputational damage. 
However, according to the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory, it is plausible to theoretically argue 
that more favorable and less heterogeneous stock recommendations could serve as a reputation-
protection vehicle whereby investors believe that such firms have forthcoming stronger performance 
and wealthier pool of economic resources that enable them to more efficiently absorb the adverse 
consequences of the announced operational risk events and more effectively remedy their 
fundamental causes. Hence, more optimistic and less dispersed expert opinion could help protect 
rather than damage the firm’s reputation upon the unexpected arrival of bad news. 
Therefore, given the contradictory theories and mixed empirical evidence in the literature, we 
formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1: There are reputational effects of stock recommendations around operational risk 
announcements in financial institutions 
 
2.2.2. Debt Analysts’ Credit Ratings 
Analysts’ credit ratings indicate the creditworthiness of the rated firm (i.e. its ability to honor the 
cash flow obligations of its liabilities; especially the repayments of interests and principals of its bond 
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issuances) as evaluated by highly informed experts, that is credit rating agencies. The credit ratings 
generally range from “Prime” (AAA) to “In Default” (D)8. Obviously, the higher the credit rating 
level, the more inclined the less informed debt investors and liquidity traders would be to invest in the 
respective firm’s bonds, thus increasing the market valuation of those bonds. Moreover, credit ratings 
are generally split into two major groups from the debt investor’s perspective; Investment Grade “IG” 
and Speculative (Non-investment) Grade “SG”. Speculative Grade firms/bonds are rated BB+ or 
lower and are sometimes termed “Junk Bonds”; they generally imply a much higher default risk than 
Investment Grade firms/bonds. Therefore, debt investors require a much higher return (i.e. due to a 
higher default risk premium) on their junk investments. 
The impact of credit rating announcements on equity markets is quite controversial due to the 
known conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders. For instance, Maxwell & Stephens, 
2003 found that credit ratings are more likely to be downgraded following open market share 
repurchases which increase the shareholders’ wealth to the detriment of creditors’ investments. 
Therefore, we include credit ratings as a control variable in our regressions modelling the equity-
based reputational impact of operational risk announcements (although we are still interested in 
analyzing any inferences that can be drawn from their respective coefficients estimated in our 
multivariate equity-based regressions).   
However, the impact of credit rating announcements on the CDS markets is more straightforward. 
In a recent study, Wang et al., 2014 studied the informational contents of credit rating updates in the 
Australian CDS market and found that credit rating updates have a slight negative impact on abnormal 
CDS spreads (i.e. positive impact on the implied default risk) and that outlook updates impose no 
significant effect on CDS markets. We add to the findings of Wang et al., 2014 by inspecting the 
reputational implications of credit rating levels around reputation-damaging operational risk 
announcements in financial institutions. We argue that our findings would benefit both the debt 
investors and the loss firm itself. For the debt investors, our findings provide evidence regarding the 
impact of credit rating levels on the implied default risk, thus enhancing the quality of the debt 
investor’s investment decision around operational risk announcements. Second, our findings help the 
loss firm’s management evaluate the extent to which their current credit rating level might serve as a 
reputation-protection mechanism around operational risk announcements and whether they would 
need further post-announcement actions to restore their firm’s reputation. 
Previous research has found a positive association between the incidence of operational risk and 
credit risk in financial institutions (Chernobai et al., 2011). Hence, it could be posited that debt 
investors ex ante expect that firms with higher credit rating levels will incur more frequent and/or 
more severe operational risk events. Hence, the unexpected arrival of bad news in the form of 
                                                          
8 The credit rating levels used in this paper are based on the classifications of Standard & Poor's (S&P) long-term ratings. 
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operational risk announcements could violate the prior expectations of debt investors, thus causing a 
more serious debt-based reputational damage for firms with higher credit rating levels. In line with 
this proposition, Sturm, 2013a found that CDS markets react more adversely to operational risk 
announcements in firms with higher credit ratings.  
However, according to the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory, credit ratings could act as a 
reputational shield since debt investors might view firms with higher credit rating levels (e.g. “IG” 
firms) as financially stronger and economically more stable, thus making such firms less vulnerable to 
bankruptcy following the announcements of operational risk events. Hence, debt investors could give 
firms with legitimate, institutionalized and more favorable creditworthiness the benefit of the doubt 
and penalize them less harshly upon the unanticipated release of the bad news. 
Therefore, given the contradictory theories and mixed empirical evidence in the literature, we 
formulate our second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: There are reputational effects of credit ratings around operational risk announcements in 
financial institutions 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample Selection and Composition 
The sample selection procedure is reported in Table 1. We begin with all 16,110 public 
announcements from the commercial ORIC International database which spans the period 1921 – 
2015
9
. Since ORIC announcements were only regularly collected starting 2010, our sample period 
covers the post global financial crisis (post-GFC) years (2010 – 2014). We exclude announcements 
before 2010 and after 2014, announcements in non-financial firms (because the nature of operational 
risk is clearly different from that in financial institutions), announcements in loss firms not 
headquartered in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan (to coincide with previous operational 
risk studies that mostly focused on advanced economies), announcements which have no clear 
operational risk classification (i.e. no event type or business line), announcements whose dates are not 
confirmed or full-text news articles not found (we have double-checked and downloaded available 
full-texts of operational risk announcements from LexisNexis news database) and announcements in 
privately held financial firms. To reduce noise in the data due to simultaneous market reactions to 
other types of announcements, we also exclude 98 operational risk announcements overlapping with 
earnings announcements or credit rating announcements (i.e. two trading weeks before and after the 
operational risk announcement). In addition, the only two announcements associated with 
                                                          
9 ORIC International is a company that collects and reports both public and private operational loss data 
(www.oricinternational.com). In this paper, we use data from the public database, which consists of identified operational 
risk events around the world. Search algorithms are used to collect the data from the Internet. For this paper, the ORIC 
International data was extracted in March 2015. 
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“Underperform” stock recommendation are removed. Finally, 18 operational risk announcements are 
dropped due to missing data on variables collected from DataStream and Bloomberg.  
Hence, we end up with our final sample comprising 255 operational risk announcements from 81 
financial institutions publicly listed in 20 countries which hit the public media news during the years 
2010 – 2014 (Table 2, Panel A). Our final sample enables the generalization of our results as its size 
exceeds the sample sizes in most of previous studies on operational and reputational risks such as 115 
events (1974 – 2004) in Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005), 103 events (1994 – 2006) in Gillet et al. 
(2010), 71 events (1994 – 2006) in Plunus et al. (2012), 99 events (2004 – 2010) in Sturm (2013a) and 
136 events (2000 – 2009) in Sturm (2013b); with the exception of 492 events (1978 – 2003) in 
Cummins et al. (2006) and 430 events (1994 – 2008) in Fiordelisi et al. (2014). 
Our final sample is also well diversified as it encompasses 16 different industry subtypes of 
financial institutions (according to the Bloomberg classification) with most of the sample coming 
from banking-related activities (187/73%) and the remaining events belonging to brokerage-related 
activities (19/8%), wealth and investment management-related activities (34/13%), and insurance-
related activities (15/6%) (Table 2, Panel B). 
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 here] 
3.2. Variables Tested and Data Sources 
3.2.1. Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
We collect data on the most recent consensus equity analysts’ stock recommendations which are 
issued at least two trading weeks before each operational risk announcement from Bloomberg 
database. The data on consensus stock recommendations is collected and coded for our empirical 
analysis in a cardinal scale as follows: 1 for “Strong Buy”, 2 for “Buy”, 3 for “Hold”, 4 for 
“Underperform” and 5 for “Sell”. Obviously, favorability of the stock is decreasing in the cardinal 
scale used with the highest favorability for 1 and least favorability for 5. Our final sample comprises 
108 “Buy” stocks and 147 “Hold” stocks (Table 2, Panel C). 
We use the median stock recommendation to proxy for the central tendency of the most recent 
consensus stock recommendations. More specifically, we code a dummy variable Buy Stock 
Recommendation as 1 if the median of most recent consensus stock recommendations is “Buy” and 0 
otherwise. To examine the impact of the heterogeneity of analysts’ opinions regarding the favorability 
of the stocks, we employ the continuous variable StDev Stock Recommendation which is the standard 
deviation of the most recent consensus stock recommendations. 
 
3.2.2. Credit Ratings 
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Debt analysts’ credit ratings reflect the credit risk involved in lending to a particular firm. Higher 
credit ratings obviously indicate a better creditworthiness of the borrowing firm. Credit ratings are 
subject to updates from time to time, when debt analysts find reasons to change their beliefs on the 
credit rating itself (i.e. upgrade or downgrade) or the intermediate-term outlook of the 
creditworthiness of the borrowing firm (i.e. positive, stable or negative). Since our sample includes no 
sufficient variation in the credit rating outlook data
10
, we focus our analysis on credit rating levels (i.e.  
“Prime” AAA to “In Default” D) and credit rating classifications (i.e. Investment Grade “IG” versus 
Speculative Grade “SG”).  
We collect data on the most recent Standard & Poor's long-term, local issuer credit rating updates 
before each operational risk announcement from Bloomberg. Since the relationship between credit 
ratings and default risk is known to be non-linear, we convert our credit ratings into the respective 
default probability using the global corporate average cumulative default rate (five-year horizon) of 
S&P long-term local issuer credit rating from 1981 to the year preceding the operational risk event 
announcement date. We use a five-year horizon because we are interested in the long-term 
reputational implications of operational risk announcements and to coincide with the five-year CDS 
spread data that is used to capture the debt-based reputational impact of operational risk 
announcements. Data on transition matrices is collected from the “Annual Global Corporate Default 
Study And Rating Transitions” reports published annually by S&P Global and summarized in 
Appendix B. We name this variable Credit Rating Level. 
Additionally, to capture the average equity-based and debt-based reputational differences across 
the two major credit rating groups from the debt investor’s perspective, we construct a dummy 
variable Speculative Grade that is coded 1 if the most recent credit rating of the loss firm is BB+ or 
lower and 0 otherwise. 
We were able collect credit rating data for 223 out of 255 announcements. The highest (lowest) 
credit rating level in our sample is AA (B-). In addition, 12% of our sample are Speculative Grade 
firms (Table 2, Panel D). As reported in Table 3, Credit Rating Level has an average (median) of 
1.69% (0.69%) with a minimum (maximum) of 0.25% (28.76%). 
 
3.2.3. Equity-based Reputational Damage 
Following the literature on operational risk announcements (Fiordelisi et al., 2014, 2013; Gillet et 
al., 2010; Perry & Fontnouvelle, 2005; Sturm, 2013b), we measure the direct equity market reaction 
to operational risk announcements using the cumulative abnormal stock return (𝐶𝐴𝑅) estimated by 
the single-index market model with the estimation period being a window of 250 trading days ending 
                                                          
10 In our sample, 221 out of 223 most recent credit rating updates have a “Stable” outlook. 
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one calendar month before the announcement date. We use a more conservative approach reflected in 
a shorter event window (-5,+5). We collect data on stock prices and local market indices from 
DataStream. 
Also, following the literature on reputational risk (Fiordelisi et al., 2014, 2013; Gillet et al., 2010), 
we measure the equity-based reputational damage using the loss-adjusted 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (hereafter, 
Reputational Return or 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅) which we compute according to the following formula: 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) = 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) + |
𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(−5, +5)
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(−6)
| 
We measure market capitalization six trading days before the announcement date to exclude any 
impact on the firm’s market value caused by the leakage of private information in the trading week 
preceding the announcement date. We consider 𝑂𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(−5, +5)  to be zero when no 
operational loss amount is disclosed during the event window (-5,+5). Since we use a relatively short 
event window (-5,+5) which is clean from any other announcements, we believe that  𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) 
accurately measures the pure reputational impact (i.e. non-mechanical market reaction to the 
information disclosed in the operational risk announcement).  
Table 3 shows that the mean 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) is 0.82% (p-value= 0.0608) which indicates no 
reputational damage on average in our sample, thus contradicting previous papers on operational and 
reputational risks (Fiordelisi et al., 2014, 2013; Gillet et al., 2010) and hence gives a strong motivation 
to examine the factors which have caused this different result.  
We estimate the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model to extract the equity-based 
reputational impact of analysts’ stock recommendations around the announcement of an operational 
risk event 𝑖 incurred by the loss firm 𝑗 during the event window (−5, +5): 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)
= 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗
+ 𝛽3 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽10 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 +  𝛽12 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑗
+ 𝛽13 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽14 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽15 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽16 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗
+ 𝛽17 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽18 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽19 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽20 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗
+ 𝛽21 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
According to the particular version of the model estimated, 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 could be 
either the median (i.e. Buy Stock Recommendation) or dispersion (i.e. StDev Stock Recommendation) 
of the most recent consensus stock recommendations preceding the operational risk event 
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announcement. Similarly, dependent on the version of the model tested, 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗 could be 
either Credit Rating Level or Speculative Grade (as defined in Section 3.2.2.). 
Since almost 48.60% of our sample announcements are associated with non-negative 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) (i.e. supposedly not incurring an equity-based reputational damage) (Table 3), we 
devise a logit regression model to distinguish between firms incurring reputational damage and firms 
not incurring reputational damage around the operational risk announcement. In this sense, we look 
into how analysts’ stock recommendations affect the likelihood of reputational damage. Our proposed 
logit model is more conservative than the order logit model used by Fiordelisi et al., 2013 who 
defined reputational damage as 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅 in the lowest third of the 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅 distribution (even if it is non-
negative).  
We estimate the following binary logit model to estimate the impact of analysts’ stock 
recommendations on the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage around the announcement of 
an operational risk event 𝑖 incurred by the loss firm 𝑗 during the event window (−5, +5): 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑟 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)
Pr (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) ≥ 0)
)
= 𝜂𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛿2 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗
+ 𝛿3 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛿4 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛿5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛿6 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+  𝛿7 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛿8 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛿9 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛿10 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛿11 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 +  𝛿12 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑗
+  𝛿13 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗 + 𝛿14 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝛿15 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝛿16 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗
+ 𝛿17 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛿18 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛿19 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛿20 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗
+ 𝛿21 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used to infer the significance of regression 
coefficients produced by estimating our OLS and logit regression models. 
 
3.2.4. Debt-based Reputational Damage 
Following (Sturm, 2013a), we employ the cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶) and 
cumulative abnormal CDS relative spread change (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶) to measure the change in the implied 
default risk of the loss firm caused by operational risk announcements. To the extent that operational 
losses are covered by the shareholders’ equity (i.e. only affect the expected cash flows received by the 
shareholders), operational risk events should not be relevant to the expected cash flows received by 
the creditors (Plunus et al., 2012). Hence, we argue that any positive impact on 𝐶𝐴(𝑅)𝑆𝐶 would 
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indicate both an increase in the implied default risk of the loss firm and a pure reputational loss (i.e. 
debt-based reputational damage).  
We have chosen to employ CDS spreads rather than bond returns to measure the debt-based 
impact of operational risk announcements (i.e. which we consider as a proxy for both the pure 
reputational impact and change in implied default risk around the operational risk announcement). 
There are three reasons for our choice. First, Ericsson, Jacobs, & Oviedo, 2009 found that CDS 
spreads are superior to stock returns and bond returns in measuring the default risk of the business 
entity. Second, Mengle, 2007 documented a boost in CDS market liquidity due to the increased 
contribution of hedge funds in more recent years. Third, Blanco et al., 2005 showed that the causality 
relationship flows from CDS spreads (the cause) to bond spreads (the effect) and not vice versa.  
Following Sturm, 2013a, we collect data on five year modified modified structure CDS spreads in 
Euros from DataStream and data on iTraxx index from Bloomberg. 
We compute cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (CASC) as follows: 
𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = (𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡−1) − (𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 − 𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡−1) 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(𝒕𝟏,𝒕𝟐) = ∑ 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑡
𝒕𝟐
𝒕=𝒕𝟏
 
Also, we compute cumulative abnormal CDS spread relative change (CARSC) as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 = (
(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡−1)
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
) − (
(𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 − 𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡−1)
𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡−1
) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(𝒕𝟏,𝒕𝟐) = ∑ 𝐴𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑡
𝒕𝟐
𝒕=𝒕𝟏
 
Table 3 shows that the mean 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) is 5.58 basis point (p-value = 0.0001) and mean 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) is 2.13% (p-value = 0.0031). This initial result shows that our sample 
announcements cause a severe debt-based reputational damage in CDS markets, thus calling for 
further research to examine the determinants of such a damage.  
Since operational risk announcements are known to directly hit the stock prices of loss firms but 
are only indirectly related to debt markets, we expect 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) to be an endogenous variable in 
the structural equation estimating the CDS market reactions to operational risk announcements. 
Differently speaking, we propose that the following instrumental variables: the equity analysts’ stock 
recommendation (Buy Stock Recommendation), annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns 
(StDev Stock Return), systematic risk (beta), percentage of outstanding shares available to ordinary 
shareholders (float percent), and natural logarithm of trading volume (Trading Volume) to affect 
𝐶𝐴(𝑅)𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) only through their impact on 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). 
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Hence, to examine the debt-based reputational impact of credit ratings around the announcement 
of an operational risk event 𝑖 incurred by the loss firm 𝑗 during the event window (−5, +5), we 
estimate the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) model: 
First-stage Regression is to estimate the endogenous variable 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5): 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)
= 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗
+ 𝛽3 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽5 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽10 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 +  𝛽12 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑗
+ 𝛽13 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑗 + 𝛽14 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝛽15 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽16 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑗
+ 𝛽17 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽18 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛽19 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽20 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗
+ 𝛽21 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
Second-stage regression is to estimate 𝐶𝐴(𝑅)𝑆𝐶(−5, +5): 
𝐶𝐴(𝑅)𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)
= 𝜅𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾1 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗 + 𝛾2 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛾3 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛾4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾5 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛾6 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾7 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾8 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛾9 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾10 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑖 +  𝛾11 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑗
+ 𝛾12 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑗 + 𝛾13 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑗 + 𝛾14 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗 + 𝛾15 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗
+ 𝛾16 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑗 + 𝛾17 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)̂ + 𝜐𝑖𝑗 
Where 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5)̂  is the estimated value of 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) from the first-stage regression. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standards errors are used to infer the significance of regression coefficients 
produced by estimating both stages of our 2SLS regression model.  
 
3.2.5. Control Variables 
To properly identify our multivariate regression models, we include control variables that are 
commonly used in the market-based literature. To consider the information environment of the loss 
firm, we employ the number of analysts following the firm in the month preceding the announcement 
(Analyst Coverage). We collect data on analyst coverage from Bloomberg. Table 3 shows that at least 
one analyst has to be following the loss firm prior to the operational risk announcement in order to be 
included in our final sample. In Table 3, the mean (median) number of analysts following is 22(23) 
The Reputational Effects of Analysts’ Stock Recommendations and Credit Ratings 
15 
 
which reflects the adequate visibility that our sample firms enjoy, thus confirming the importance and 
relevance of expert advice to the equity and debt investors of these firms.  
We also control for the size, profitability, leverage and growth of the loss firm using the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Total Assets), return on assets (ROA), long-term debt to shareholders’ equity 
ratio (Leverage) and ratio of market value of equity to its book value (Market to Book Ratio), 
respectively. In addition to the accounting-based proxies, we control for the market-based 
performance of the loss firm. First, we control for the riskiness of the loss firm using market-based 
measures which are the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns (StDev Stock Return) and 
monthly betas (Beta). Second, we consider the share’s floatation by including the percentage of 
outstanding shares available to ordinary shareholders one week before the announcement date (Float). 
Third, we control for the trading volume by including the natural logarithm of the number of shares 
traded for the stock (in thousands) one week before the announcement date (Trading Volume). We 
collect accounting and market data from DataStream. Since we conduct a multi-country analysis, we 
control for the GDP per capita whose data is collected from the World Bank’s website (GDP Per 
Capita). Table 3 shows the wide range of values for the accounting-based, market-based and country-
level variables, thus confirming the diversity of our final sample.  
Since the reputational impact of operational risk announcements could also be caused by the 
features of the operational risk event or characteristics of the announcement per se, we control for 
these factors in our empirical analysis. We collect data on event and announcement dummies by 
double-checking the contents of operational risk announcements in LexisNexis. First, we employ a 
dummy variable to capture whether the operational loss amount is disclosed or leaked in the event 
window (-5,+5) (Loss Disclosed Dum). Table 3 shows that 69% of our sample announcements have 
the operational loss amount disclosed during the event window (-5,+5). In addition, we control for 
whether the operational risk event has been recognized by the loss firm itself (Firm Recognized Dum). 
This does not necessarily mean that the loss firm has issued a press release, but this recognition could 
simply be mentioned in the first press-cutting (for example, a representative of the loss firm has made 
a short comment confirming the event but challenging the relevant fine imposed by a regulatory body 
or court of law).  
Moreover, we include a dummy variable to indicate whether a simultaneous regulatory 
announcement concerning the operational risk event has been made (Regulatory Announced Dum). 
Almost always, operational risk announcements come out on the same trading day of the relevant 
regulatory announcement. Furthermore, a dummy variable is included to indicate whether the first 
announcement includes a final settlement (Settlement Dum). 16% of our final sample are final 
settlement announcements (Table 3). Furthermore, we control for the location of the operational risk 
event itself (not the announcement) and whether it has taken place in a different country from the loss 
firm’s incorporation country (Different Country Dum).  
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Additionally, we consider whether the operational risk event has involved top corporate figures 
(i.e. board directors or one of the five highest paid executive officers of the loss firm) (Top Figures 
Dum). Moreover, since ORIC International employs additional “non-Basel II” business lines such as 
life insurance, general insurance and insurance broking, we include a dummy variable to control for 
the “Basel II” business lines which are: corporate finance, trading and sales, retail banking, 
commercial banking, payment and settlement, agency services, asset management and retail 
brokerage (Basel Business Line Dum). Table 3 shows that the majority of our final sample (78%) are 
events incurred in “Basel II” business lines. We also control for the fraudulent nature of the event by 
including a dummy variable to capture whether the operational risk event is classified as an internal 
fraud or external fraud (Fraud Dum). Table 3 shows that 13% of our final sample are either internal 
fraud or external fraud events. Finally, we control for the regional effects by adding a dummy variable 
for events incurred by U.S. firms (U.S. Firm Dum). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
4.1.1. Equity-based Reputational Effects of Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 
Table 4 (Panel A) reports the mean 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) and proportion of operational risk 
announcements causing an equity-based reputational damage (i.e. negative 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5))  for the 
“Buy” versus “Hold” stock recommendations and “Low Dispersion” versus “High Dispersion” stock 
recommendations in our final sample.  
 “Buy” firms are clearly associated with much lower reputational return (i.e. the difference is 
1.79% and significant at the 10% level) and higher probability of reputational damage (i.e. the 
difference is approximately 14% and significant at the 5% level) than “Hold” firms. Subject to the 
conventional caveats of univariate analysis, this result initially indicates that equity investors are 
calmer around operational risk events incurred by “Hold” firms. One possible explanation is the long-
term investment strategies that are implied by “Hold” stock recommendation and are less sensitive to 
short-term idiosyncratic informational shocks. 
In addition to mean comparisons across median stock recommendation groups, we split our final 
sample into two groups according to the dispersion of most recent consensus stock recommendations. 
“Low Dispersion” group includes firms whose standard deviation of stock recommendations is lower 
than or equal to our sample’s median (i.e. 0.93), whilst “High Dispersion” group includes the 
remaining observations. 
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“Low Dispersion” firms are clearly associated with much lower reputational return (i.e. the 
difference is 1.79% and significant at the 5% level) and higher probability of reputational damage (i.e. 
the difference is approximately 15% and significant at the 5% level) than “High Dispersion” firms. 
Again, our preliminary results suggest that equity investors revise their prior beliefs more 
aggressively and adversely when there is less ex ante heterogeneity in analyst’s stock 
recommendations. Differently speaking, the informational shock caused by operational risk 
announcements is amplified when it is less expected (i.e. when there is more agreement among 
analysts’ stock recommendations). 
Overall, considering the typical reservation of no controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in 
univariate analysis, the results in Table (4), Panel (A) lend support to the “Expectancy Violation” 
theory whereby more favorable and less heterogenous stock recommendations constitute a 
reputational liability due to heightened expectations that are seriously challenged by the unexpected 
negative information about the loss firm released via operational risk announcements.   
 
4.1.2. Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings 
Table 4 (Panel B) reports the mean 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) and mean 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) around operational 
risk announcements for the “Low Credit Rating” versus “High Credit Rating” groups and 
“Speculative Grade” versus “Investment Grade” groups in our final sample. 
The “Low Credit Rating” group includes firms whose five-year cumulate default probability is 
higher than or equal to our sample’s median (i.e. 0.69%), whilst the “High Credit Rating” group 
includes the remaining observations. 
The results strongly imply that lower credit ratings are reputationally damaging around operational 
risk announcements. First, on average, “Low Credit Rating” firms incur a higher 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (i.e. 
the difference is 11 basis points and significant at the 1% level) and a higher 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (i.e. the 
difference is 3.5% and significant at the 5% level) than “High Credit Rating” firms. Second, “SG” 
firms incur a higher 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (i.e. the difference is 40 basis points and significant at the 1% 
level) and a higher 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (i.e. the difference is 11.6% and significant at the 1% level) than 
“IG” firms. 
Overall, the results in Table (4), Panel (B) strongly support the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory 
whereby higher credit ratings serve as a reputational asset that could make investors grant the loss 
firm the benefit of the doubt and hence penalize it less harshly, thus ultimately alleviating the debt-
based reputational damage caused by operational risk announcements. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
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4.2.1. Equity-based Reputational Effects of Analysts’ Stock Recommendations around 
Operational Risk Announcements 
Table 5 reports the effects of analysts’ stock recommendations and most recent credit ratings on 
the reputational cumulative abnormal return 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) and the log-odds of equity-based 
reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑟 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5,+5)<0)
Pr (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5,+5)≥0)
) around operational risk event announcements incurred by 
financial institutions. Model (1) shows that firms with “Buy” stock recommendation incur a more 
severe reputational damage than firms with “Hold” stock recommendation. The adverse reputational 
impact is statistically significant and economically strong; “Buy” firms lose around 2% in reputational 
return more than “Hold” firms. In the same Model (1), there is no significant impact of the number of 
analysts following the firm Analyst Coverage on 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). This result implies that it is the 
favorability of analysts’ recommendations, rather than the intensity of analyst coverage per se, that 
drives the equity-based reputational impact of unexpected bad news. In addition, Model (2) confirms 
the results in Model (1) by showing that “Buy” firms are more likely to incur an equity-based 
reputational damage (i.e. negative 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)) around operational risk announcements.  
It is interesting to note that once Credit Rating Level and Speculative Grade enter Models (3) and 
(5), respectively, the impact of Buy Stock Recommendation on 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) becomes much weaker 
and insignificant. Nevertheless, even after controlling for the credit rating effects in Models (4) and 
(6), “Buy” firms are still more likely than “Hold” firms to suffer an equity-based reputational damage 
around operational risk announcements. Taken together, the results of  Buy Stock Recommendation in 
Table (5) indicate that equity investors would revise their ex ante beliefs more aggressively for “Buy” 
firms than for “Hold” firms around operational risk announcements, thus increasing the likelihood of 
reputational damage for the earlier. However, considering the credit rating effects (which will be 
discussed later in this subsection), the extent of reputational damage for “Buy” firms might not be as 
severe as implied by the univariate results reported in Table (4), Panel (A). Overall, these results 
suggest that favorable stock recommendations constitute a reputational liability (i.e. a more favorite 
stock recommendation is associated with a more severe reputational damage) whereby unexpected 
bad news cause investors to revise downwardly their prior elevated expectations that have proved 
hard to be met. 
Moreover, in Table (5), Panel (A), Credit Rating Level enters insignificant in Models (3) and (4). 
However, Speculative Grade enters negative but insignificant (coefficient of -0.031043) in Model (5) 
estimating 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) and enters positive and significant at the 5% level (coefficient of 
1.800284) in Model (6) estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage. Hence, this 
result indicates that “SG” firms are more likely than “IG” firms to incur an equity-based reputational 
damage, but such a reputational damage might not be severe enough to warrant a significantly 
negative coefficient on  Speculative Grade in Model (5). Overall, these results reflect that credit 
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ratings act as a reputational asset whereby investors give “IG” firms the benefit of the doubt and 
hence penalize them less aggressively than “SG” firms once unanticipated adverse news hits the 
equity markets.  
It is however crucial to note that the equity-based reputational results in Table (5) imply that stock 
recommendations constitute a reputational liability, whilst credit ratings serve as a reputational asset 
around operational risk announcements. There could be a number of explanations for this finding. 
First, by nature, credit ratings have a longer future horizon and are less volatile and less heterogenous 
than stock recommendations. Second, credit ratings are institutionally issued and updated by fewer 
agencies
11
, whilst stock recommendations are developed and revised by a bigger number of individual 
analysts
12
 some of whom might have been following the respective firm for a very short time, lack 
sufficient industry-specific expertise, or miss access to costly private information. Third, in some 
countries, increased regulation of equity research could give credit rating agencies an informational 
advantage by accessing private information that is not freely available to equity analysts. For 
example, Regulation Fair Disclosure in the U.S., prohibiting the selective nonpublic disclosure to 
equity analysts but allowing it to credit rating agencies, was found to substantially increase the 
informational content of credit rating updates (Jorion, Liu, & Shi, 2005). Taking the three reasons 
together, it could be viable to believe that credit ratings are more “institutionally legitimate” than 
stock recommendations. In other words, less informed investors and liquidity traders show credit 
ratings as providing more stable and consistent information than stock recommendations about the 
future economic performance and risk profile of the respective firm. Hence, the idiosyncratic 
informational shocks cause equity investors to revise their ex ante beliefs formed by stock 
recommendations more frequently and more aggressively than they do for credit ratings. 
The results in Table (5), Panel (B) show that StDev Stock Recommendation has no clear 
reputational impact around operational risk announcements. This indicates that investors revise their 
prior beliefs based on the median, rather than the dispersion, of stock recommendations. However, the 
results for Credit Rating Level and Speculative Grade resemble those reported in Table (5), Panel (A).  
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2.2. Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings around Operational Risk 
Announcements 
                                                          
11 It is noteworthy that our empirical analysis covers the post global financial crisis period (post-GFC) during and 
immediately after which several credit rating agencies were heavily criticized by practitioners and academics, and fined by 
regulators and supervisors for their practices regarding inaccurate and upwardly biased credit ratings of financial institutions 
and instruments (Griffin & Tang, 2011, 2012). Therefore, it can be expected that post-GFC (i.e. during our sample period) 
credit rating agencies have become more careful in issuing and updating their rating decisions, especially for financial 
institutions and instruments that were at the core of the harsh criticism. 
12 We realize that most of equity analysts work for brokerage houses but it is also well-established in the literature that 
individual analyst’s characteristics, such as future career concerns (Horton, Serafeim, & Wu, 2017)  and behavioral bias 
(Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler, & Agarwal, 2009), might create an incremental bias in their stock recommendations and 
earnings forecasts. 
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Since equity markets and CDS markets could react simultaneously to operational risk 
announcements, we consider this possible endogeneity when identifying our multivariate models for 
the debt-based reputational damage around operational risk announcements. Our main assumption 
here is that equity markets would react faster than CDS markets to operational risk announcements. 
This is because operational risk events and related losses are expected to directly hit the equity capital 
of a loss firm, whereas they will only indirectly impact on the long-term creditworthiness of the loss 
firm. Therefore, we treat 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) as an endogenous variable in the models identifying the 
debt-based reputational effects of credit ratings around operational risk announcements. 
Table 6 reports the results on the debt-based reputational effects of credit rating levels and “SG” 
ratings around operational risk announcements in financial institutions. Due to limited CDS data 
availability, the debt-based sample (135 observations) is obviously much smaller than the equity-
based sample (255 observations), whose results are reported in Table 5. However, our debt-based 
sample is still bigger than the samples used in Sturm, 2013a and Plunus et al., 2012 who also studied 
the impact of operational risk announcements in debt (CDS and bonds) markets although they have 
covered longer sample periods in their respective studies. 
Firstly, starting with Table 6 (panel A), the endogeneity (Stock-Write) test (i.e. test values range 
from 3.27 with p-value of 0.6578 in Model (2) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) to 3.39 with p-value of 
0.6404 in Model (3) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5)) fails to reject the null hypothesis that 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) is an endogenous variable in the structural equation identified. Hence, after passing 
the endogeneity test, we move on to test the validity of the instrumental variables chosen. As 
discussed in Section 3.2.4., we have employed five instrumental variables which are the “Buy” stock 
recommendation (Buy Stock Recommendation), annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns 
(StDev Stock Return), systematic risk (beta), the percentage of outstanding shares available to 
ordinary shareholders (float percent), and the natural logarithm of the stock’s trading volume 
(Trading Volume). The F-test of excluded instruments (i.e. test value is 2.60 and p-value is 0.029) 
rejects the null hypothesis that those instrumental variables can jointly be excluded from the first-
stage regression (i.e. the regression estimating 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)). Hence, we deduce that the 
instrumental variables employed are strictly exogenous to the second-stage regression.  
To confirm the validity of our group of instrumental variables, the overidentification (Sargan) test 
(i.e. test values range from 0.925 with p-value of 0.9209 in Model (2) to 1.910 with p-value of 0.7524 
in Model (3)) fails to reject the null hypothesis that the structural equation is not over-identified 
meaning that there are no redundant instruments. Regarding the strength of the instrumental variables 
selected (i.e. their joint explanation power of 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)), the partial R-squared of excluded 
instruments is 0.0987 indicating that variations in our instrumental variables explain, on average, 
around 9.87% of variations in 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)). Although this is not a high R-squared value, 
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considering previous papers using 2SLS regression models (for example, Laeven & Levine, 2009), it 
would still indicate that our chosen instruments are not weak. 
Regarding the second-stage regression, the coefficients of Credit Rating Level enter statistically 
significant and economically powerful. For Model (2) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), the coefficient of 
Credit Rating Level is 10.07 (p-value < 0.01). This is a big economic magnitude; for example, a credit 
rating downgrade from AA- to A+ in 2014 (i.e. amounting to 0.14% increase in the five-year 
cumulative default probability; see Appendix B) would increase 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by 1.41 basis point. 
However, the economic impact would be much more severe if the downgrade is across lower credit 
ratings. For example, a credit rating downgrade from BB- to B+ in 2014 (i.e. amounting to 5.72% 
increase in the five-year cumulative default probability; see Appendix B) would increase 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by 57.60 basis point (approximately, 40 times bigger than the increase in 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) following the AA- to A+ downgrade).  
The results in Model (3) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) confirm the findings in Model (2). The 
coefficient of Credit Rating Level is 0.0367 (p-value < 0.01). Again, the economic magnitude is 
economically strong since a one-point downgrade from AA- to A+ and from BB- to B+ in 2014 
would cause an increase in 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by 0.51% and 21%, respectively. 
The results in Table (6), Panel (B) support the findings inferred from Table (6), Panel (A). In 
summary, “SG” firms incur a more severe debt-based reputational damage than “IG” firms around 
operational risk announcements. More specifically, on average, an “SG” firm would incur 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5)) that is higher by 41.08 basis point (15.34%) than “IG” firms.  
These results are qualitatively similar to the mean differences reported in Table (4), Panel (B); again, 
confirming our inferences about the reputational shields created by higher credit ratings. 
Taken together, the results in Table (6) imply two main findings. First, credit ratings serve as a 
reputational asset that effectively mitigates the adverse debt-based reputational consequences of 
operational risk announcements. Second, the debt-based reputational effects of credit ratings around 
operational risk announcements are non-linear (i.e. a one-point credit rating downgrade could 
seriously be more damaging; both economically and reputationally, if it happens at the lower “SG” 
ratings). 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
5.1. U.S. Firms 
Most of previous studies on the reputational effects of operational risk announcements have been 
performed in an international context (for example, Fiordelisi et al., 2013; Perry & Fontnouvelle, 
2005; Plunus et al., 2012)). In Addition, Gillet et al. (2010) have compared US and European 
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subsamples and found that the reputational damage occurs only in US firms possibly due to their 
higher market values which lower the magnitude of the mechanical market reaction to the operational 
risk announcement (i.e. the operational loss amount divided by the loss firm’s market value). On the 
contrary, Fiordelisi et al. (2014) found that the reputational losses are more severe in European firms. 
Given this mixed evidence in the literature, we want to find out whether our empirical results differ 
across regions. Hence, we interact U.S. Firm Dum with our four measures of expert advice
13
.  
The results, reported in Table (7), Panel (A)
14
, show that all our empirical results are not different 
across regions, except for the standard deviation of stock recommendations; the variable of interest is 
the interaction term StDev * U.S. Firm. In Model (3) estimating 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5), StDev * U.S. Firm 
enters negative (-0.218457) and significant at the 5% level. It indicates that more heterogeneity in 
analysts’ stock recommendations would trigger a reputational damage only if the operational risk 
event is incurred by a U.S. firm. However, it is noteworthy that StDev Stock Recommendation has a 
significantly positive coefficient (0.127155). Moreover, the results reported in Model (4) estimating 
the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage confirm the findings from Model (3).  
Thus, adhering to the “Expectancy Violation” theory, less heterogenous stock recommendations 
would constitute a reputational liability around operational risk announcements only in non-U.S. 
firms. One possible explanation for this finding is that, in our sample, StDev Stock Recommendation 
is, on average, significantly higher in non-U.S. firms (0.95) than U.S. firms (0.83); hence, equity 
investors would view stock recommendations of non-U.S. firms to be less stable (i.e. less legitimate) 
and more aggressively challenge them around sizable informational shocks. 
 
5.2. Fraud Incidents 
13% of our sample are fraud events (i.e. internal fraud or external fraud)
15
. Previous studies have 
documented strong adverse reputational consequences of fraud events in financial institutions. For 
example, Perry and Fontnouvelle (2005) documented a drop in the market value by more than double 
the operational loss ratio for internal fraud announcements. However, Fiordelisi et al. (2014) have 
found that external fraud announcements cause the most severe reputational damage. Other studies 
such as Sturm (2013b) and Fiordelisi et al. (2013) have not located a conclusive evidence regarding 
the reputational effects of operational risk event types. Given this mixed evidence in the literature, we 
                                                          
13 In unreported further analysis, we attempted other geographical regions and countries such as United Kingdom and Japan, 
but we did not find any significant differences for our four measures of expert advice. 
14 For the sake of brevity, only the variables of interest are reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
15 There are six event types in our final sample whose counts are: Internal Fraud (13), External Fraud (19), Clients, Products 
and Business Practices (212), Execution, Delivery and Process Management (4), Employment Practices and Workplace 
Safety (4), Business Disruption and System Failures (3). 
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are interested in examining how event types might be driving our empirical results. Hence, we interact 
Fraud Dum with our four measures of expert advice
16
. 
The results, reported in Table (7), Panel (B), show that only our debt-based inferences are effected 
by fraud incidence. In Model (5) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), the interaction term Credit Rating Level 
* Fraud enters positive and significant at the 5% level (the coefficient is 2.15). This result indicates 
that credit ratings play a more important role as a reputational shield when a fraud event is announced. 
For example, a one-point upgrade from B+ to BB- in 2014 (i.e. amounting to 5.72% decrease in the 
five-year cumulative default probability; see Appendix B) would decrease 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by an 
increment of 12.3 basis point for fraud events. Model (7), also estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), confirm the 
inferences above; “SG” firms suffer an additional increase in 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) amounting to 7.86 basis 
points for fraud events. However, the interaction terms Credit Rating Level * Fraud and Speculative 
Grade * Fraud enter economically powerful but statistically insignificant in Models (6) and (8) 
estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5). 
Overall, we interpret these results as supporting the “Institutional Legitimacy” theory for credit 
ratings. Since fraud events usually raise more serious suspicions about the integrity of senior 
management and other employees of the loss firm (in the case of internal fraud) and the effectiveness 
of preventive and detective internal controls (in the case of external fraud), the “institutional” and 
“legitimate” credit ratings should be more instrumental in cooling down investors’ frustrations and 
mitigating the debt-based reputational damage caused by operational risk announcements involving 
fraud allegations. 
 
5.3. Basel Business Lines 
Few previous studies on operational risk have focused on business lines as classified by Basel II 
(BCBS, 2006). One possible reason is the absence of clear theory to distinguish between different 
business lines as this classification seems to be driven mainly by practical implications rather than 
theoretical justifications. In an international sample, Fiordelisi et al. (2014) have found that “Trading 
and Sales’’ and ‘‘Payment and Settlement” events incur the most severe reputational damage. To put 
more robust theoretical reasoning behind this bit of further analysis, we distinguish between the eight 
Basel business lines as one group (i.e. Basel Business Line Dum = 1) and other non-Basel business 
lines used in ORIC (i.e. Basel Business Line Dum = 0)
17
. It is noteworthy that most non-Basel 
                                                          
16 In unreported further analysis, we examined the interaction effects of other event types such as Internal Fraud (separately), 
External Fraud(separately), Clients, Products, and Business Practices and Executive, Delivery, and Process Management, but 
we did not find any significant differences for our four measures of expert advice. 
17 There are fourteen business lines in our final sample whose counts are: Agency Services (13), Asset Management (5), 
Commercial Banking (14), Corporate Finance (14), Corporate Services (32), Financial Exchanges (3), General Insurance (4), 
Insurance Broking (4), Life Assurance (5), Payments and Settlement (6), Wealth Management (7), Retail Banking (77), 
Retail Brokerage (10), Trading and Sales (61). 
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business lines (we call it ORIC business lines) are available in non-banking firms. Hence, Basel 
Business Line Dum mostly captures the bank-specific business models.
18
 
The results, reported in Table (7), Panel (C), show that credit ratings are more crucial in protecting 
from the debt-based reputational damage incurred by operational risk announcements in non-Basel 
business lines (i.e. non-banking activities). In Model (5) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), the interaction 
term Credit Rating Level * Basel enters negative (-2.27) and significant at the 5% level. For example, 
a one-point upgrade from B+ to BB- in 2014 (i.e. amounting to 5.72% decrease in the five-year 
cumulative default probability; see Appendix B) would decrease 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by an increment of 
13 basis point for non-Basel business lines. Also, in Model (7) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5), the 
interaction term Speculative Grade * Basel enters negative (-8.84) and significant at the 5% level. 
This result indicates that, on average, transiting from the “SG” category to the “IG” category would 
decrease 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) by an increment of 8.84 basis point for non-Basel business lines. The results 
in Models (6) and (8) estimating 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) confirm the findings above. 
One possible explanation for this result is that, compared with non-banks (i.e. non-Basel business 
lines), there is more regulated operational risk management and disclosure (e.g. robust methods of 
quantifying and reporting the operational risk regulatory capital) and stronger investor protection (e.g. 
deposit guarantees) in banks (i.e. Basel business lines), thus downplaying the importance of credit 
ratings as soft reputational shields. 
 
5.4. Top Figures  
Several studies have documented a firm-level and manager-level reputational damage following 
adverse news announcements such as fraud allegations and financial statement restatements involving 
senior management (for example, Chakravarthy, De Haan, & Rajgopal, 2014; Desai, Hogan, & 
Wilkins, 2006; Fich & Shivdasani, 2007). Hence, we want to find out whether our empirical results 
are sensitive to operational risk announcements including top figures in the loss firm. By top figures 
we mean any board director or one of the five highest paid executives affiliated with the loss firm at 
the time of the announcement. The announcement needs to explicitly mention that the top figure is 
directly responsible for the operational risk event. Applying these criteria, only 8% of our sample 
events are associated with a top figure. 
Our results, reported in Table (7), Panel (D), indicate that equity investors revise their prior beliefs 
more aggressively for less heterogenous stock recommendations when the bad news involves a top 
figure. The consequences could be disastrous to the loss firm since, according to Model (3) estimating 
                                                          
18 In unreported further analysis, we substitute Basel Business Line Dum with another dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
loss firm is a bank and 0 otherwise. The results remain qualitatively similar; thus, confirming our conjecture about the 
differences between Basel business lines and ORIC business lines. 
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𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5), a one-point decrease in StDev Stock Recommendation (i.e. less heterogeneity) would 
cause 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) to drop by an increment of 41.5% when the operational risk event is committed 
by a top figure. The results in Model (4) estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 
confirm the findings above. 
Collectively, this result implies that announcing a misconduct of senior management in less risky 
firms (i.e. where analysts disagree less about its stock recommendation) causes an extremely serious 
downward correction of investors’ ex ante expectations about the firm’s future economic profile; thus, 
demolishing its reputation and, possibly, raising a going-concern red flag.
19
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
6.1. Settlement Loss Amount as a Correction for All Events 
As explained in Section 3.2.3., to compute 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5), we utilized the ratio of the actual 
disclosed loss amount to the loss firm’s market value in order to partial out the mechanical market 
reaction included in 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). Two reservations can be made about using the actual disclosed 
loss amount. First, the loss amount to market value adjustment would be forced to be zero in all 
announcements where the loss amount is unknown at the announcement date; hence, possibly, 
downwardly biasing our equity-based reputational measure 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). Second, according to 
Gillet et al. (2010), market participants can unbiasedly estimate the future loss amount. Hence, as a 
robustness check, we use the ex post (settlement) loss amount as a correction for all events in our final 
sample.
20
 
The results reported in Table (8), Panel (A) are rerun replications of the regressions in Tables (5) 
and (6) using the alternative measure of 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5). For the sake of brevity, only the coefficients 
of our four measures of expert advice are reported. Clearly, the results in all eight models strongly 
coincide with the findings in our main regressions; thus, confirming that the inferences drawn are not 
affected by any possible bias in our equity-based reputational measure.
21
 
6.2.  Time Elapsed Since Last Credit Rating Update 
Another reservation that can be made about our results is that there could be a considerable lag 
period between the operational risk event and preceding credit rating update; thus, possibly diluting 
                                                          
19 In unreported further analysis, we interacted our four measures of expert advice with other event and announcement 
characteristics which are: Loss Disclosed Dum, Firm Recognized Dum, Regulatory Announced Dum, Settlement Dum, and 
Different Country Dum, but we could not find significant or consistent results for the interaction terms. 
20 The average (median) settlement loss is USD 301 (73) million and its minimum (maximum) is USD 1.19 (6,108) million. 
Its standard deviation is USD 686 million. 
21 In unreported robustness checks, we reran all our main regressions for different shorter event windows such as (-1,+1), (-
3,+3), (0,+3), (0,+5) and found qualitatively similar results though little weaker for very short event windows such (-1,+1) 
and post-event windows such as (0,+3). This implies that the reputational effects of expert advice need longer time to 
materialize and extend to influence investors’ behaviour in the pre-event windows when private and uncertain information 
about the operational risk event might have leaked into the markets. 
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any reputational effects of credit ratings due to new information injected into the markets during this 
lag period. Hence, as a robustness check, we introduce the variable Lag which is the number of days 
since the most recent credit rating update
22
. The variables of interest are Credit Rating Level * Lag 
and Speculative Grade * Lag. 
The results, reported in Table (8), Panel (B), show that the equity-based reputational effects of 
credit ratings weaken as more time elapses. In Model (1) estimating 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5), Credit Rating 
Level enters negative (-0.009077) and significant at the 1% level, whilst the interaction term Credit 
Rating Level * Lag enters positive (0.000012) and significant at the 5% level. This result implies the 
contribution of credit ratings as an equity-based reputational shield deteriorates by time and that credit 
ratings, in the long term, become an equity-based reputational liability. In other words, the more time 
is elapsed since most recent credit rating, the more aggressively equity investors would revise their 
prior beliefs around operational risk announcements in firms with higher credit ratings. The results in 
Models (2), (3), and (4) confirm the findings above for the log-odds of equity-based reputational 
damage and “IG” firms. Our results coincide with Wade et al. (2006) who found that CEO 
certifications gained from Financial World’s contest cause short-term positive abnormal returns but 
impose a long-term adverse impact on the firm’s market performance. 
To clarify the economic magnitude and implication of this result, we give the following example. 
The turnaround point (i.e. the point of time at which credit ratings become a reputational liability 
rather than a reputational asset), suggested my Model (1), is 756 days which correspond to 
approximately 66% of our sample. Now, let us assume that two identical operational risk events are 
incurred by two firms, (A) and (B), on the same day in 2014. Both firms have the same credit rating 
BBB+; however, the only difference is that the lag since most recent credit rating is 100 days for firm 
(A) and 900 days for firm (B). Hence, according to Model (1), if both firms were rated one-point 
higher (for example, A- rather than BBB+; corresponding to a reduction of 0.58% in the five-year 
cumulative default probability; see Appendix (B)), this would increase 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) by 0.46% in 
firm (A), but decrease it by 0.10% in firm (B). Hence, higher credit ratings would serve as an equity-
based reputational asset in firm (A) and an equity-based reputational liability in firm (B). 
It is however noteworthy that, unlike the equity-based results discussed above, the time elapsed 
does not dilute the debt-based reputational effects of credit ratings. In Models (5), (6), (7), and (8), 
both interaction terms Credit Rating Level * Lag and Speculative Grade * Lag enter insignificant. 
This indicates that, regardless of the lag, higher credit ratings would persistently serve as a debt-based 
reputational shield around operational risk announcements. One possible explanation for the 
differences between the equity-based and debt-based reputational results is that equity-based investors 
of publicly listed firms are protected from the corporate bankruptcy consequences by the 
                                                          
22 The average (median) Lag is 525 (639) days and its minimum (maximum) is 38 (2088) days. Its standard deviation is 425 
days. 
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“Shareholder’s Limited Liability” harbor and therefore tend to revise the reputational implications of 
credit ratings over time. On the contrary, debt investors view credit ratings as a direct measure of the 
firm’s default risk and an indirect measure of its reputation and therefore are less likely to revise their 
prior beliefs only because of elapsed time. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on a sample of 255 operational risk event announcements from 81 financial institutions 
publicly listed in 20 countries which hit the public media news during the post-global financial crisis 
years 2010 – 2014, our empirical results strongly support the proposition that stock recommendations 
and credit ratings drive the reputational effects caused by the unexpected arrival of bad news into 
financial markets. However, the persistence and magnitude of such reputational effects differ 
according to several factors. 
Generally speaking, stock recommendations represent a reputational liability, whilst credit ratings 
serve as a reputational asset around operational risk announcements in financial institutions. More 
specifically, “Buy” stocks and “SG” firms are more likely to incur an equity-based reputational 
damage. Moreover, firms with lower credit ratings incur a much more severe debt-based reputational 
damage.  
Additionally, we performed a further analysis to find out whether the reputational effects of expert 
advice are moderated by event characteristics. A number of interesting inferences are drawn. First, 
equity investors revise their prior beliefs more aggressively in non-US firms with less heterogenous 
stock recommendations. Second, credit ratings are more instrumental in mitigating the debt-based 
reputational damage caused by fraud incidents or incurred in non-Basel business lines (i.e. non-
banking activities). Third, the misconduct of senior management could demolish the reputation of 
firms with less heterogenous stock recommendations. 
Finally, our robustness checks reveal two additional findings. First, our main empirical results are 
robust to the usage of settlement loss as a correction in computing our equity-based reputational 
measure. Second, credit ratings serve as an equity-based reputational asset in the short term but turn 
into a reputational liability in the long term.  
All in all, our paper covers the most common source of reputational risk in the financial industry; 
that is operational risk announcements. However, further research could be done to examine the 
reputational effects of expert advice for other reputation damaging events in financial and non-
financial firms, such as money laundry cases, product recalls, downsizings and layoffs. Moreover, 
future studies could investigate whether credit-related operational risk event announcements might 
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cause a debt-based reputational damage which is more severe than the resulting equity-based 
reputational damage. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection Procedure 
This table reports the selection criteria and procedure of our final sample comprising operational risk event announcements in publicly listed 
financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 
– 2014). 
Sample Selection Procedure Observations 
Complete ORIC Database (March 2015) 16110 
(-) Announcements before 1
st
 January 2010 (804) 
(-) Announcements after 31
st
 December 2014 (99) 
(-) Announcements in non-financial Firms (2190) 
(-) Announcements in loss firms not headquartered in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan (3101) 
(-) Announcements which have no clear operational risk classification (event type or business line) (5362) 
(-) Announcements whose dates are not confirmed or full-text press articles not found (3396) 
(-) Announcements in private financial firms (785) 
(-) Announcements overlapping with earnings announcements or credit rating announcements (two trading 
weeks before and after the operational risk announcement) 
(98) 
(-) Announcements with “Underperform” stock recommendation (2) 
(-) Announcements in loss firms with incomplete DataStream and Bloomberg data  (18) 
Final Sample 255 
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Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). 
Panel A: By Country 
Country Frequency Percent% 
Australia 13 5.1 
Austria 2 0.78 
Belgium 1 0.39 
Canada 2 0.78 
France 3 1.18 
Germany 14 5.49 
Hungary 2 0.78 
Ireland 1 0.39 
Israel 1 0.39 
Italy 1 0.39 
Japan 30 11.76 
Netherlands 3 1.18 
Norway 1 0.39 
Russian Federation 2 0.78 
Spain 2 0.78 
Sweden 2 0.78 
Switzerland 18 7.06 
Turkey 6 2.35 
United Kingdom 69 27.06 
United States 82 32.16 
Total 255 100 
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Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014).  
Panel B: By Industry Type 
Industry Type Frequency Percent% 
Banks 55 21.57 
Consumer Finance 3 1.18 
Corporate Banking 1 0.39 
Diversified Banks 117 45.88 
Institutional Brokerage 19 7.45 
Institutional Trust, Fiduciary & Custody 5 1.96 
Insurance Brokers 1 0.39 
Investment Income - Life Insurance 1 0.39 
Investment Management 3 1.18 
Life Insurance 7 2.75 
Mortgage Finance 3 1.18 
Other Financial Services 2 0.78 
P&C Insurance 6 2.35 
Retail Banking 14 5.49 
Trading & Principal Investment 4 1.57 
Wealth Management 14 5.49 
Total 255 100 
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Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). 
Panel C: By Stock Recommendation 
Stock Recommendation Frequency Percent% 
Buy 108 42.35 
Hold 147 57.65 
Total 255 100 
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Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). 
Panel D: By Credit Rating 
Credit Rating Grade Credit Rating Level Frequency Percent% 
Investment Grade 
AA 5 2.24 
AA- 10 4.48 
A+ 36 16.14 
A 43 19.28 
A- 76 34.08 
BBB+ 18 8.07 
BBB 9 4.04 
Speculative Grade 
BB+ 11 4.93 
BB 7 3.14 
B- 8 3.59 
 Total 223 100 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables tested. Variables description is reported in the appendix. 
Variables Obs Min Median Mean StDev Max 
RCAR(-5,+5) 255 -0.2174 -0.0024 0.0082 0.0695 0.5334 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0) 255 0 1 0.5137 0.5008 1 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) 135 -31 1.78 5.58 16.3 40.51 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) 135 -0.2178 0.0253 0.0213 0.082 0.218 
Buy Stock Recommendation 255 0 0 0.42 0.5 1 
StDev Stock Recommendation 255 0 0.93 0.91 0.2 1.41 
Credit Rating Level 223 0.25 0.69 1.69 3.81 28.76 
Speculative Grade 223 0 0 0.12 0.32 1 
Analyst Coverage 255 1 23 21.57 8.55 37 
Loss Disclosed Dum 255 0 1 0.69 0.46 1 
Firm Recognized Dum 255 0 0 0.33 0.47 1 
Regulatory Announced Dum 255 0 1 0.56 0.50 1 
Settlement Dum 255 0 0 0.16 0.37 1 
Different Country Dum 255 0 0 0.26 0.44 1 
Top Figures Dum 255 0 0 0.08 0.27 1 
Basel Business Line Dum 255 0 1 0.78 0.41 1 
Fraud Dum 255 0 0 0.13 0.35 1 
U.S. Firm Dum 255 0 0 0.32 0.48 1 
StDev Stock Return 255 0.0084 0.0202 0.0223 0.0103 0.0766 
Beta 255 0.26 1.72 1.80 0.71 4.46 
Float 255 0 92 78.03 27.60 100 
Trading Volume 255 25 11732 25431 46980 333408 
Total Assets 255 756 1079727 1189585 906101 2867222 
ROA 255 -3.59 0.37 0.37 1.08 7.2 
Leverage 255 0 1.5 1.65 1.05 5.46 
Market to Book Ratio 255 0.32 0.9 1.04 0.69 4.79 
GDP Per Capita 255 10646 48374 49157 14009 100575 
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Table 4: Univariate Analysis 
This table reports the mean comparison tests of the severity and probability of reputational damage around operational risk announcements in financial 
institutions for different types of analysts’ stock recommendations and credit ratings. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Panel A: Equity-based Reputational Effects of Stock Recommendations 
 
Buy Hold Difference 
Low 
Dispersion 
High 
Dispersion 
Difference 
Mean 𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) -0.0000373 0.0178959 -0.0179332 -0.0013943 0.0164647 -0.0178591 
   (-1.9154)*   (-2.0581)** 
       
Probability of Reputational Damage 0.5555556 0.4140625 0.1414931 0.5932203 0.4452555 0.1479649 
   (2.1804)**   (2.3739)** 
Observations 108 147  137 118  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Univariate Analysis 
This table reports the mean comparison tests of the severity and probability of reputational damage around operational risk announcements in financial 
institutions for different types of analysts’ stock recommendations, credit rating levels and credit rating changes. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Panel B: Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings 
 
Low Credit 
Rating 
High Credit 
Rating 
Difference 
Speculative 
Grade 
Investment 
Grade 
Difference 
Mean 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 10.46766 -0.5404946 11.00815 40.5132 0.2000611 40.31314 
   (4.1257)***   (18.1377)*** 
       
Mean 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓 0.0368617 0.0018096 0.0350521 0.121783 0.0058214 0.1159616 
   (2.5178)**   (6.3567)*** 
Observations 75 60  18 117  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: Equity-based Reputational Effects of Analysts’ Stock Recommendations around Operational 
Risk Announcements 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1), (3) and (5) and the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based 
reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0))in Models (2), (4) and (6) around operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and 
Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported 
in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance 
of the regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Panel A: Buy Stock Recommendation 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.020017 0.656676 -0.011373 0.836043 -0.011436 0.839954 
 (2.28)** (2.13)** (1.05) (2.25)** (1.06) (2.26)** 
Credit Rating Level   -0.000680 -0.005610   
   (0.31) (0.12)   
Speculative Grade     -0.031043 1.800284 
     (1.45) (1.98)** 
Analyst Coverage 0.000519 -0.024317 0.001244 -0.017390 0.001254 -0.015909 
 (0.66) (0.93) (1.21) (0.57) (1.21) (0.52) 
Loss Disclosed Dum 0.001180 0.542829 0.005804 0.543956 0.008166 0.426968 
 (0.14) (1.66)* (0.70) (1.50) (0.93) (1.17) 
Firm Recognized Dum -0.012752 0.006993 -0.015456 0.061312 -0.018727 0.276249 
 (0.93) (0.02) (1.10) (0.14) (1.29) (0.60) 
Regulatory Announced Dum -0.010159 0.186968 -0.008086 0.227981 -0.006249 0.130291 
 (0.99) (0.64) (0.76) (0.70) (0.59) (0.39) 
Settlement Dum 0.010851 -0.684883 0.011722 -0.919533 0.011221 -0.911095 
 (0.86) (1.40) (0.86) (1.72)* (0.83) (1.70)* 
Different Country Dum -0.003345 0.006814 0.001843 -0.217523 -0.000777 -0.076840 
 (0.31) (0.02) (0.15) (0.50) (0.06) (0.18) 
Top Figures Dum -0.008715 -0.757437 0.003045 -1.006443 0.002361 -1.064053 
 (0.22) (1.26) (0.06) (1.42) (0.05) (1.52) 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.011693 0.171760 -0.011375 0.096965 -0.008371 -0.068955 
 (0.86) (0.48) (0.71) (0.24) (0.53) (0.17) 
Fraud Dum -0.001103 0.134262 0.007625 -0.180510 0.006123 -0.175547 
 (0.08) (0.27) (0.57) (0.33) (0.42) (0.32) 
U.S. Firm Dum 0.000027 -0.046011 0.008240 -0.348368 0.005435 -0.210784 
 (0.00) (0.11) (0.61) (0.73) (0.39) (0.43) 
StDev Stock Return 1.110933 -1.491603 0.667923 5.559275 0.821027 -1.060144 
 (1.72)* (0.09) (0.93) (0.30) (1.08) (0.05) 
Beta 0.011041 -0.360671 0.009407 -0.491178 0.011429 -0.640884 
 (1.48) (1.25) (0.88) (1.45) (1.13) (1.85)* 
Float -0.000155 0.002542 -0.000396 -0.003264 -0.000390 -0.002717 
 (0.75) (0.42) (0.97) (0.33) (0.97) (0.26) 
Ln(Trading Volume) -0.001976 0.067012 -0.000420 0.060984 -0.000314 0.060811 
 (0.50) (0.72) (0.09) (0.57) (0.06) (0.56) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.010129 -0.159188 0.007427 -0.289909 0.004159 -0.051396 
 (1.84)* (1.01) (1.01) (1.41) (0.58) (0.22) 
ROA 0.013355 -0.284136 0.002780 -0.078834 0.001125 0.001656 
 (2.27)** (1.38) (0.32) (0.30) (0.15) (0.00) 
Leverage 0.002556 -0.078426 0.003821 -0.161643 0.003076 -0.127398 
 (0.37) (0.47) (0.53) (0.87) (0.43) (0.71) 
Market to Book Ratio 0.006525 -0.037017 0.011467 -0.091870 0.010677 -0.000627 
 (0.82) (0.13) (1.01) (0.28) (1.03) (0.00) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000000 0.000006 0.000000 0.000025 0.000000 0.000028 
 (0.20) (0.50) (0.43) (1.33) (0.41) (1.36) 
Constant -0.145988 1.812196 -0.135531 3.537047 -0.096146 0.275789 
 (2.16)** (0.94) (1.47) (1.31) (1.10) (0.10) 
R2 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.09 
N 255 255 223 223 223 223 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
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Table 5: Equity-based Reputational Effects of Analysts’ Stock Recommendations around Operational 
Risk Announcements 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1), (3) and (5) and the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based 
reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0))in Models (2), (4) and (6) around operational risk event 
announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and 
Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported 
in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance 
of the regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Panel B: Dispersion of Stock Recommendations 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
StDev Stock Recommendation -0.001452 -0.081644 0.057677 -1.244970 0.046051 -0.234821 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.97) (0.97) (0.73) (0.18) 
Credit Rating Level   0.000165 -0.026859   
   (0.09) (0.55)   
Speculative Grade     -0.021625 1.746896 
     (1.00) (1.75)* 
Analyst Coverage 0.000501 -0.022512 0.000962 -0.009002 0.001003 -0.012038 
 (0.71) (0.88) (1.11) (0.31) (1.16) (0.40) 
Loss Disclosed Dum 0.002893 0.473590 0.009008 0.434279 0.010057 0.365807 
 (0.34) (1.46) (1.00) (1.20) (1.09) (1.02) 
Firm Recognized Dum -0.015348 0.067976 -0.013210 0.019073 -0.016441 0.270369 
 (1.11) (0.16) (0.96) (0.04) (1.15) (0.59) 
Regulatory Announced Dum -0.011823 0.236191 -0.005910 0.251997 -0.005419 0.224098 
 (1.19) (0.80) (0.61) (0.76) (0.55) (0.68) 
Settlement Dum 0.011362 -0.671250 0.009251 -0.855333 0.009523 -0.886649 
 (0.88) (1.37) (0.67) (1.59) (0.70) (1.68)* 
Different Country Dum -0.005398 0.050149 0.002897 -0.253907 0.000777 -0.104719 
 (0.50) (0.13) (0.24) (0.61) (0.06) (0.25) 
Top Figures Dum -0.012185 -0.628695 0.002624 -0.885247 0.002746 -0.918595 
 (0.31) (1.07) (0.06) (1.33) (0.06) (1.38) 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.010765 0.137312 -0.011656 0.083716 -0.009163 -0.097847 
 (0.78) (0.39) (0.71) (0.21) (0.56) (0.24) 
Fraud Dum 0.001748 0.055339 0.006708 -0.189841 0.006676 -0.226245 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.47) (0.34) (0.45) (0.42) 
U.S. Firm Dum -0.002332 -0.015664 0.017068 -0.557789 0.013366 -0.286063 
 (0.19) (0.04) (1.00) (1.07) (0.75) (0.53) 
StDev Stock Return 1.119495 -1.577531 0.624937 8.025929 0.719299 1.167485 
 (1.69)* (0.09) (0.88) (0.44) (0.94) (0.06) 
Beta 0.011419 -0.333420 0.003133 -0.298315 0.006100 -0.537028 
 (1.30) (1.14) (0.28) (0.87) (0.54) (1.44) 
Float -0.000159 0.002573 -0.000393 0.000259 -0.000416 0.001865 
 (0.75) (0.42) (1.15) (0.03) (1.21) (0.17) 
Ln(Trading Volume) -0.002831 0.088325 0.000138 0.067889 -0.000030 0.086957 
 (0.65) (0.99) (0.02) (0.66) (0.01) (0.84) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.009177 -0.113764 0.006251 -0.218105 0.003395 0.016670 
 (1.59) (0.73) (0.86) (1.08) (0.51) (0.07) 
ROA 0.010354 -0.158690 -0.003274 0.183490 -0.003352 0.219453 
 (1.71)* (0.87) (0.42) (0.69) (0.48) (0.60) 
Leverage 0.003166 -0.099107 0.004084 -0.180181 0.003707 -0.147147 
 (0.46) (0.60) (0.59) (0.98) (0.52) (0.84) 
Market to Book Ratio 0.008585 -0.099447 0.013905 -0.260332 0.012591 -0.171191 
 (1.01) (0.37) (1.24) (0.82) (1.18) (0.51) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000000 0.000005 0.000000 0.000018 0.000000 0.000019 
 (0.27) (0.43) (0.54) (0.94) (0.51) (0.97) 
Constant -0.135927 1.377174 -0.176943 3.779118 -0.127062 -0.443994 
 (1.94)* (0.71) (2.12)** (1.26) (1.49) (0.15) 
R2 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.08 
N 255 255 223 223 223 223 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings around Operational Risk Announcements 
This table reports the results of the 2SLS regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Model (2) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Model (3) around operational risk event announcements in 
publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-
global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). Model (1) reports the results of the first-stage 
regression estimating the endogenous variable 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)̂ . Variables description is reported in the 
appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the 
regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Panel A:  Credit Rating Level 
Variables 
First-stage Regression Second-stage Regression 
(1) (2) (3) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Credit Rating Level -0.001083 10.065152 0.036700 
 (-0.115) (5.726)*** (3.432)*** 
Analyst Coverage 0.000604 -0.089736 -0.000594 
 (0.432) (-0.389) (-0.376) 
Loss Disclosed Dum 0.007644 1.174823 0.019428 
 (0.550) (0.568) (1.133) 
Firm Recognized Dum -0.026848 1.969654 0.003487 
 (-1.332) (0.578) (0.138) 
Regulatory Announced Dum 0.001202 -1.569754 -0.023628 
 (0.094) (-0.858) (-1.755)* 
Settlement Dum 0.020500 -5.412411 -0.030190 
 (1.083) (-1.657)* (-1.071) 
Different Country Dum -0.033981 0.451873 0.004700 
 (-1.633) (0.157) (0.205) 
Top Figures Dum -0.037233 9.803622 0.037481 
 (-0.987) (1.553) (0.738) 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.027568 7.430481 0.028532 
 (-1.495) (1.955)* (1.273) 
Fraud Dum 0.015491 -5.139993 -0.030015 
 (0.886) (-1.516) (-1.062) 
U.S. Firm Dum -0.028949 -4.340883 -0.029066 
 (-1.206) (-1.311) (-1.021) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.040411 -3.684138 -0.017609 
 (2.381)** (-1.259) (-0.831) 
ROA 0.008169 6.652850 0.040729 
 (0.440) (2.312)** (2.075)** 
Leverage 0.008167 -4.628701 -0.038116 
 (0.934) (-2.815)*** (-3.192)*** 
Market to Book Ratio 0.025491 -1.033899 0.000546 
 (1.342) (-0.313) (0.025) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000002 0.000004 0.000000 
 (1.273) (0.031) (0.515) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.012592   
 (-1.229)   
StDev Stock Return 1.562020   
 (1.639)   
Beta 0.024989   
 (2.059)**   
Float -0.000067   
 (-0.165)   
Ln(Trading Volume) -0.005355   
 (-1.307)   
RCAR(-5,+5)  82.349901 0.449997 
  (1.329) (1.082) 
Constant -0.681504 48.776471 0.253233 
 (-2.638)*** (1.154) (0.828) 
Observations 135 135 135 
R-squared 0.288 0.663 0.295 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments  0.0987 0.0987 
F-test of excluded instruments  2.60 2.60 
Prob > F  (0.029)** (0.029)** 
Endogeneity (Stock–Wright) test  3.27 3.39 
(p-value)  (0.6578) (0.6404) 
Overidentification (Sargan) test  0.925 1.910 
(p-value)  (0.9209) (0.7524) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Debt-based Reputational Effects of Credit Ratings around Operational Risk Announcements 
This table reports the results of the 2SLS regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Model (2) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Model (3) around operational risk event announcements in 
publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-
global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). Model (1) reports the results of the first-stage 
regression estimating the endogenous variable 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)̂ . Variables description is reported in the 
appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the 
regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Panel B:  Speculative Grade 
Variables 
First-stage Regression Second-stage Regression 
(1) (2) (3) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Speculative Grade -0.012566 41.076384 0.153432 
 (-0.322) (5.730)*** (3.317)*** 
Analyst Coverage 0.000581 -0.186976 -0.000940 
 (0.421) (-0.817) (-0.600) 
Loss Disclosed Dum 0.007938 0.969042 0.018593 
 (0.566) (0.503) (1.123) 
Firm Recognized Dum -0.026789 2.215556 0.004550 
 (-1.333) (0.666) (0.180) 
Regulatory Announced Dum 0.001332 -1.423967 -0.023137 
 (0.105) (-0.796) (-1.734)* 
Settlement Dum 0.020127 -5.705293 -0.031254 
 (1.076) (-1.761)* (-1.109) 
Different Country Dum -0.034270 -0.206478 0.002517 
 (-1.651) (-0.076) (0.113) 
Top Figures Dum -0.036953 8.439892 0.032191 
 (-0.973) (1.343) (0.635) 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.026620 6.406271 0.024464 
 (-1.391) (1.696)* (1.091) 
Fraud Dum 0.015690 -4.747248 -0.028686 
 (0.899) (-1.416) (-1.016) 
U.S. Firm Dum -0.028247 -4.735311 -0.030493 
 (-1.181) (-1.450) (-1.073) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.038471 -3.150611 -0.014981 
 (2.164)** (-1.105) (-0.728) 
ROA 0.005656 5.664808 0.037849 
 (0.309) (2.041)** (1.933)* 
Leverage 0.007435 -4.427229 -0.037254 
 (0.825) (-2.691)*** (-3.136)*** 
Market to Book Ratio 0.025546 -1.609140 -0.001372 
 (1.373) (-0.498) (-0.063) 
GDP Per Capita 0.000002 0.000014 0.000000 
 (1.294) (0.098) (0.536) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.012280   
 (-1.198)   
StDev Stock Return 1.594080   
 (1.656)   
Beta 0.024157   
 (2.043)**   
Float -0.000042   
 (-0.102)   
Ln(Trading Volume) -0.005493   
 (-1.332)   
RCAR(-5,+5)  79.649196 0.444985 
  (1.269) (1.055) 
Constant -0.654624 51.773134 0.254277 
 (-2.493)** (1.285) (0.860) 
Observations 135 135 135 
R-squared 0.288 0.673 0.302 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments  0.0982 0.0982 
F-test of excluded instruments  2.46 2.46 
Prob > F  (0.0372)** (0.0372)** 
Endogeneity (Stock–Wright) test  2.12 3.10 
(p-value)  (0.8318) (0.6848) 
Overidentification (Sargan) test  0.127 1.703 
(p-value)  (0.9981) (0.7902) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Further Analysis 
This table reports the summarised further analysis results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk 
event announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) 
period (2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of 
the regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Panel A: U.S. Firms 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation 0.000018 0.634918       
 (0.00) (1.29)       
Buy * U.S. Firm -0.026246 0.465927       
 (1.39) (0.65)       
StDev Stock Recommendation   0.127155 -2.790527     
   (1.67)* (1.74)*     
StDev * U.S. Firm   -0.218457 4.565852     
   (2.29)** (1.77)*     
Credit Rating Level     10.645433 0.039193   
     (6.359)*** (3.649)***   
Credit Rating Level * U.S. Firm     1.270897 0.008807   
     (1.326) (1.172)   
Speculative Grade       43.793566 0.165614 
       (6.389)*** (3.561)*** 
Speculative Grade * U.S. Firm       5.176580 0.033502 
       (1.281) (1.052) 
U.S. Firm Dum 0.018821 -0.537610 0.207202 -4.560683 -5.221835 -0.036802 -4.607548 -0.030611 
 (1.16) (0.92) (2.23)** (1.91)* (-1.329) (-1.097) (-1.403) (-1.080) 
R2 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.649 0.287 0.655 0.290 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Further Analysis 
This table reports the summarised further analysis results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk 
event announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) 
period (2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of 
the regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Panel B: Fraud Incidents 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.010370 0.712295       
 (0.92) (1.85)*       
Buy * Fraud -0.008301 1.197924       
 (0.38) (1.17)       
StDev Stock Recommendation   0.069823 -1.618895     
   (0.98) (1.04)     
StDev * Fraud   -0.044939 1.383312     
   (0.41) (0.50)     
Credit Rating Level     10.509355 0.038770   
     (6.125)*** (3.670)***   
Credit Rating Level * Fraud     2.150450 0.011178   
     (2.083)** (1.465)   
Speculative Grade       43.310392 0.163619 
       (6.195)*** (3.612)*** 
Speculative Grade * Fraud       7.863285 0.040881 
       (1.821)* (1.279) 
Fraud Dum 0.011568 -0.781948 0.046091 -1.406253 -6.734044 -0.039267 -4.870047 -0.029745 
 (0.64) (0.98) (0.45) (0.54) (-1.697)* (-1.203) (-1.473) (-1.078) 
R2 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.645 0.292 0.655 0.298 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Further Analysis 
This table reports the summarised further analysis results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk 
event announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) 
period (2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of 
the regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Panel C: Basel Business Lines 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.013411 1.142254       
 (0.41) (1.54)       
Buy * Basel 0.002543 -0.377769       
 (0.07) (0.46)       
StDev Stock Recommendation   0.204507 -0.692853     
   (1.53) (0.33)     
StDev * Basel   -0.207574 -0.789340     
   (1.59) (0.33)     
Credit Rating Level     12.401650 0.048760   
     (7.352)*** (4.214)***   
Credit Rating Level * Basel     -2.274609 -0.012103   
     (-2.202)** (-1.890)*   
Speculative Grade       50.740456 0.197367 
       (7.270)*** (3.944)*** 
Speculative Grade * Basel       -8.843588 -0.038757 
       (-1.986)** (-1.711)* 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.012408 0.245325 0.184101 0.831024 8.066758 0.033914 5.558993 0.019744 
 (0.66) (0.45) (1.57) (0.35) (1.869)* (1.326) (1.537) (0.914) 
R2 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.649 0.298 0.658 0.301 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Further Analysis 
This table reports the summarised further analysis results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and (3), 
the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk 
event announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) 
period (2010 – 2014). Variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of 
the regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Panel D: Top Figures 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.015849 0.895566       
 (1.69)* (2.40)**       
Buy * Top Figures 0.101297 -1.557976       
 (1.17) (1.11)       
StDev Stock Recommendation   -0.026497 -0.437111     
   (0.69) (0.31)     
StDev * Top Figures   0.414591 -5.997749     
   (2.39)** (2.19)**     
Credit Rating Level     11.009996 0.041232   
     (6.769)*** (3.938)***   
Credit Rating Level * Top Figures     -1.645419 -0.005082   
     (-1.220) (-0.457)   
Speculative Grade       44.951182 0.172262 
       (6.809)*** (3.823)*** 
Speculative Grade * Top Figures       -6.483567 -0.021211 
       (-1.099) (-0.433) 
Top Figures Dum -0.057249 -0.066644 -0.381807 4.510589 8.608418 0.029642 6.515639 0.023021 
 (1.80)* (0.06) (2.85)*** (1.69)* (1.379) (0.551) (1.199) (0.489) 
R2 0.13 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.669 0.304 0.679 0.311 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
This table reports the summarised robustness check results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and 
(3), the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk 
event announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) 
period (2010 – 2014). In computing (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5)), the ex post (settlement) loss amount is used as a correction for all events in our final sample. Other variables 
description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the regression coefficients. * 
p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Panel A: Settlement Loss Amount as a Correction for All Events 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Buy Stock Recommendation -0.010932 0.830422       
 (1.00) (2.26)**       
StDev Stock Recommendation   0.050915 -0.655843     
   (0.87) (0.54)     
Credit Rating Level     10.915079 0.040967   
     (6.653)*** (3.901)***   
Speculative Grade       44.855220 0.172093 
       (6.705)*** (3.807)*** 
R2 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.66 0.30 0.67 0.31 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks 
This table reports the summarised robustness check results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational impact 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) in Models (1) and 
(3), the logit model estimating the log-odds of equity-based reputational damage 𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠(𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0)) in Models (2) and (4), and the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression model estimating the debt-based reputational impact 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (5) and (7) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) in Models (6) and (8) around operational risk 
event announcements in publicly listed financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) 
period (2010 – 2014). Lag is the number of days since the most recent credit rating update. Other variables description is reported in the appendix. Heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors and two-tailed t-tests are used to infer the significance of the regression coefficients. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
Panel B: Time Elapsed Since Last Credit Rating Update 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
𝒍𝒏 (𝒐𝒅𝒅𝒔 
(𝑹𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒋(−𝟓, +𝟓)
< 𝟎)) 
𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 𝑪𝑨𝑹𝑺𝑪(−𝟓, +𝟓) 
Credit Rating Level -0.009077 1.240572   9.923100 0.043481   
 (2.65)*** (3.85)***   (5.075)*** (3.420)***   
Credit Rating Level * Lag 0.000012 -0.001668   0.003951 -0.000004   
 (2.56)** (4.17)***   (0.937) (-0.110)   
Speculative Grade   -0.105209 16.676859   36.682414 0.144270 
   (2.97)*** (4.60)***   (4.458)*** (2.719)*** 
Speculative Grade * Lag   0.000146 -0.028645   0.028382 0.000111 
   (3.09)*** (3.84)***   (1.190) (1.031) 
Lag 0.000007 0.001223 0.000017 -0.000201 -0.002406 0.000021 -0.001436 0.000012 
 (0.53) (2.05)** (1.27) (0.45) (-0.543) (0.586) (-0.493) (0.528) 
R2 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.657 0.261 0.680 0.281 
N 223 223 223 223 135 135 135 135 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix A: Variables Description 
Variable Name Definition Data Source(s) 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅(−5, +5) Reputational return in the event window (-5,+5) = Cumulative abnormal stock return + |(Operational loss 
amount / Market value of the loss firm one calendar week before the announcement date)|  
Cumulative abnormal stock return in the event window (-5,+5) = ∑ 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖
5
𝑖=−5 , where 
 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 = 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖  Estimation window of the 
normal stock return is 250 trading days ending one calendar month before the announcement date. Estimation 
model is single-factor market model. Original stock prices are measured in US dollar. 
- DataStream 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗(−5, +5) < 0) 1 if reputational return is negative in the event window (-5,+5); 0 otherwise - DataStream 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) Cumulative abnormal CDS spread change in the event window (-5,+5) = 
∑ 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖
5
𝑖=−5 , where 
 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 = (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 − 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1) − (𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 −
𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1).  
It is measured in euros for five year duration (modified modified structure). 
DataStream 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑆𝐶(−5, +5) Cumulative abnormal CDS relative spread change in the  event window (-5,+5) = 
∑ 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖
5
𝑖=−5 , where  𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 =
(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1)
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1
−
(𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1)
𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖−1
  
It is measured in euros for five year duration (modified modified structure). 
DataStream 
 
Buy Stock Recommendation 1 if the median of most recent consensus stock analyst recommendations before the announcement date is 
“Buy” Recommendation; 0 otherwise 
Bloomberg 
StDev Stock Recommendation Standard deviation of most recent consensus stock analyst recommendations before the announcement date Bloomberg 
Credit Rating Level Global corporate average cumulative default rate (five-year horizon) of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term 
local issuer credit rating from 1981 to the year preceding the operational risk event announcement date. Data 
on transition matrices are collected from the “Annual Global Corporate Default Study And Rating Transitions” 
reports published annually by S&P Global. 
Bloomberg 
Speculative Grade 1 if the most recent credit rating before the operational risk event announcement date is BB+ or lower; 0 
otherwise 
Bloomberg 
Analyst Coverage Number of equity analysts following the firm (i.e. issuing EPS estimates) Bloomberg 
Loss Disclosed Dum 1 if the operational loss amount is disclosed; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Firm Recognized Dum 1 if the operational risk event is recognised by the loss firm; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Regulatory Announced Dum 1 if the operational risk event is announced by a regulatory body; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
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- LexisNexis 
Settlement Dum 1 if the operational risk event is settled; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Different Country Dum 1 is the operational risk event takes place in a country different from the loss firm headquarters’ country; 0 
otherwise 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Top Figures Dum 1 if the operational risk event directly involves one or more of the board directors or chief executives; 0 
otherwise  
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Basel Business Line Dum 1 id the operational risk event is classified under one of the eight Basel II business lines: Corporate finance, 
trading and sales, retail banking, commercial banking, payment and settlement, agency services, asset 
management, retail Brokerage; 0 otherwise 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis  
Fraud Dum 1 if the operational risk event is classified as internal fraud or external fraud; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
U.S. Firm Dum 1 if the operational risk event is incurred by a U.S. firm; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis  
StDev Stock Return Standard deviation of daily stock returns for one trading year ending one calendar month before the 
announcement date  
DataStream 
Beta Monthly stock’s beta (measured at the end of calendar month preceding the announcement date) DataStream 
Float The percentage of outstanding shares available to ordinary shareholders one week before the announcement 
date 
DataStream 
Trading Volume The natural logarithm of the number of shares traded for the stock (in thousands) one week before the 
announcement date 
DataStream 
Total Assets Natural logarithm of total assets (in millions of US dollar) measured at the end of calendar quarter preceding 
the announcement date 
DataStream 
ROA Return on assets (%) DataStream 
Leverage Long-term debt / Shareholders’ equity (Decimals)  DataStream 
Market to Book Ratio Market value of equity / Book value of equity (Decimals) DataStream 
GDP Per Capita GDP per capita (in US dollar) World Bank 
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Appendix B: Credit Rating Transition Matrix 
This transition matrix summarises the global corporate average cumulative default rates (five-year horizon) of 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term local issuer credit ratings from 1981 to the years 2009 – 2013 (i.e. the years 
preceding the operational risk event announcement dates in our sample). Data on transition matrices are 
collected from the “Annual Global Corporate Default Study And Rating Transitions” reports published annually 
by S&P Global. The default rates are presented in percentages (%). 
Credit Rating 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AAA 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 
AA+ 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 
AA 0.25 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.38 
AA- 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.39 
A+ 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.53 
A 0.68 0.64 0.63 0.59 0.57 
A- 0.87 0.80 0.76 0.71 0.69 
BBB+ 1.63 1.51 1.43 1.33 1.27 
BBB 1.98 1.89 1.82 1.73 1.69 
BBB- 4.38 4.29 4.03 3.81 3.51 
BB+ 5.51 5.27 5.01 4.74 4.56 
BB 9.22 8.74 8.32 8.05 7.66 
BB- 12.14 11.52 10.96 10.75 10.33 
B+ 18.29 17.80 17.14 16.47 16.05 
B 25.09 24.40 22.87 22.04 21.02 
B- 31.05 30.00 28.76 27.98 26.93 
CCC/C 48.05 47.64 46.72 46.64 46.75 
 
 
